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OPINION
____________________
PER CURIAM:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), which affirmed without opinion a decision of an Immigration Judge (IJ).  The IJ,
among other things, denied the petitioner’s requests for withholding of removal and
asylum.  
The principal issue presented in this case is whether the record contains sufficient
evidence to support the IJ’s finding that the petitioner did not prove that he has a well
founded fear that he would be persecuted if returned to his native country of Macedonia. 
We reject this argument and hold that the IJ’s factual findings cannot be disturbed under
the very limited standard of review set out in § 242(b)(4)(B) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (requiring that a factual finding be sustained
unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”).  
3The petitioner in this case was an officer with the Macedonia National Police
Force.  He signed an agreement to remain with the Force for eight years.  During that
time, a substantial number of Albanians began to enter Macedonia, and there were
clashes between the Albanians and members of the Force.  The petitioner claims that he
received reports of abuses by the Force and that he came to fear that, if he remained with
the Force, he would be compelled to participate in such activities.  He therefore fled the
country.  
Petitioner’s argument is that, if returned to Macedonia, he would be persecuted
because of his political opinion, i.e., his view that the Macedonian police should not
engage in abusive acts directed at the Albanians who entered the country.  In order to
establish that he is eligible for asylum, the petitioner was obligated to show (a) that the
Macedonian police were committing improper acts; (b) that they were ordered to do so
by superiors; and (c) that officers who refused to comply would be subjected to adverse
consequences severe enough to rise to the level of persecution within the meaning of the
asylum statute.  For present purposes, we assume that the administrative record is
adequate to satisfy prong (a) set out above, i.e., that members of the Macedonian Police
Force engaged in widespread misconduct directed against the entering Albanians.  We
likewise assume that the evidence is adequate to satisfy prong (b).  After testifying that
he had received information about abuses “from couple of close friends who were my
roommates at the police academy,” the petitioner added: “They were forced to do that. 
4That was the order to work.”  A.R. 45.  However, even if the evidence in the
administrative record was sufficient to compel a reasonable fact finder to conclude that
the prongs (a) and (b) were satisfied, the petitioner’s argument founders because there is
plainly insufficient evidence to compel such a conclusion regarding prong (c).  
Our review of the administrative record has not disclosed any direct evidence to
support such a finding, and at oral argument, petitioner’s counsel was unable to point to
any such evidence.  We recognize that subordinates in a paramilitary organization are not
generally allowed to disobey orders without suffering adverse consequences, but we do
not believe that a reasonable fact finder would be compelled to conclude that persecution
necessarily would have followed under the circumstances present here.  A reasonable
fact finder, taking into account the illegality of the orders in question and the need for the
adverse consequences to rise to the level of persecution, could, in our judgment,
reasonably reject such a finding.  For these reasons, we hold that the record is adequate
to support the IJ’s rulings regarding eligibility for asylum and, a fortiori, withholding of
removal.  We have considered all of the petitioner’s arguments, and see no basis for
granting the petition.  
